titled to participate in the Afognak joint venture. I refer Your Honor to 94 Stat. 2371 at 2518 through 28. We're specifically listed, so we've been ratified by the U.S. Congress.

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Your Honor, there is no basis in law or fact to issue a preliminary injunction here, and I'm going to turn this over to Edgar Paul Boyko who will further expand upon that. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Mr. Boyko?

MR. BOYKO: Please the Court and distinguished counsel. I am not going to respond to Mr. Schneider's rather colorful jury argument, but I would allow there -- like to address this Court on the issue of legal and equitable considerations, and particularly on the issue of public policy which Mr. Stratman waves as a banner in his attempt at the 1995 equivalent of the great train robbery, and I'm borrowing from my distinguished colleague in terms of similes here.

The public interest, Your Honor, is indeed involved in this case. And I say this with some feeling because as Your Honor knows, I was one of the handmaidens or midwives that brought into being the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which Congress fortified by declarations of policy which stress the importance of settling Native claims, land claims in Alaska, once and for all and with certainty and stability.

As Your Honor may recall when I was sworn into

was covered by overlapping aboriginal land claims. And I've litigated before Your Honor the case against Secretary Udall who had imposed a land freeze which brought basically the — the State of Alaska to a screeching halt, and Your Honor made a correct ruling that he had no legal authority to do so and the Ninth Circuit says, well, yeah, but there's legislation pending, so I think it's premature to — to do that.

I have often been tempted to say to a court in a -let's say, a drug case, well, there's legislation pending to
decriminalize marijuana so let's not prosecute anybody. I
don't think the Ninth Circuit was right that time, I think
you were right, but in any event, Congress settled that issue
with the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.

And now twenty years later comes Mr. Stratman and says I want to unravel the fabric of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the distribution of lands, the allocation of — of resources in an entire region the — involving the — the Koniag Region, basically, because I represent the public interest. Well, we know from the record in this case what Mr. Stratman means when he talks about the public interest; he's talking about — what was it, eighteen thousand acres that he wanted and I don't know how many dollars? And I am sure if this — if he succeeds in this raid and gets an injunction with a nominal bond, that his new demand will be

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much higher than that, and that he will be able -- thinks he'll be able to extort from this Native village corporation more land and more money for himself, not for the public.

The public interest demands that this vixacious litigation be terminated once and for all, and there is nothing in the recent decision of the Ninth Circuit that precludes you from doing that on the merits. All it said is that he has a right to go back to square one and litigate the merits of his claim as a recreational user who wants to vindicate his -- his position as to the -- the validity of the original certification. Doesn't direct this Court to find for him on it; it simply says the fact that there was this settlement which blew up for one reason or another, doesn't bar him from continuing his litigation, but this Court is -- is invited to look at the issue of adminis -- of exhausting administrative remedies.

And Mr. Fitzgerald has very cogently stated to the Court how on several occasions he failed to pursue his administrative remedies, he failed to -- he failed to -- to appeal from final judgments -- a -- a final judgment of this Court, he lost in the Alaska Supreme Court, he lost here, he lost before the -- the Bureau of Indian Affairs Appeals Board, he lost before the ANCSA Appeals Board, and he's back for more.

And for the first time in twenty years, he wants not only to -- to be -- continuing litigating, but he wants

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and only source of revenue, he wants to cut off their one and only source of revenue, he wants to -- to tie up their -- their funds. He already has a lis pendens filed on all their land. He wants to have them gagged, bound and helpless, and then cut them up for his own benefit, and he is claiming to do that in the name of the United States Government, which is on the other side from him in this litigation.

I -- I -- I guess if you -- if you make a claim outrageous enough, that you can get a hearing, whereas if -- you know, if it was a little less crazy, maybe it'd be laughed out of court. I -- I sincerely hope that this Court will not be seduced into -- into granting a preliminary injunction on this state of the case.

If -- if he real -- if it's really true that there are some irreparable harm done from continuing rational, government-permitted and regulated logging operations that have been going on for years -- if that's really such a danger, then the remedy is not to grant a preliminary injunction, but simply to set this case for an early trial and, by golly, if he then prevails, he can have whatever he wants. But not at this moment to disarm and -- and force into bankruptcy one of the parties of this litigation on -- on these wild claims which have no substance in law or equity, and which we have demonstrated clearly do not have substance and which -- to which there has been no response in either the

ances and the

preadings or the oral argument thus far. And I'm waiting with bated breath what's going to happen in the next fifteen minutes.

But in any event, should Your Honor consider, and I

-- I sincerely hope and pray that you will not, issuing a
preliminary injunction, when it comes to the issue of the
bond, clearly there needs to be a determination of the facts
as to what the economic impact will be on this defendant
corporation. That was not a proper time to do at this accelerated consideration of the merits. If Your Honor even
would consider, we would like to have an opportunity to submit to you economic data to show how this would bankrupt us
and cause irreparable harm to Leisnoi.

THE COURT: Would you conclude your argu -- your argument now, counsel, please?

MR. BOYKO: Yes, sir. Mr. -- let me say one last thing that Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out, and it's in the brief so forgive me for repeating it.

What Mr. Stratman has not addressed is that even if he were to prevail somehow on this decertification issue, the — the Leisnoi Corporation would still keep the land and the government has agreed to that. It would still be private land, it would still be subject to their rational use and — and disposal. So there is no way that he can accomplish at the end what he seeks to do in some kind of preliminary,

extraordinary remedy, hoping to kind of slide it by and -- and strike a blow that will force us to the bargaining table.

I hope Your Honor will see through that and rule accordingly.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Middleton?

DEFENDANT KONIAG, INC.'S ARGUMENT

MR. MIDDLETON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'm only here for the issue that Mr. Schneider rise -- raises on the 1990 agreement with Mr. Stratman. He has made the motion that the caption should be cleaned up and Koniag dismissed. I have -- we -- we posed and I -- I have -- I have finally put into the Court a supplemental memorandum with an affidavit. The -- the purpose behind the supplemental affidavit was it was becoming apparent that Mr. Schneider -- or Mr. sna -- Stratman's motion perhaps was going to an absolute dismissal of Koniag based upon the 1990 agreement with Mr. Stratman. Let me point out a couple of things to the Court.

First, the Court has never -- this Court has never ruled on what the meaning of that 1990 agreement is, the Ninth Circuit never ruled on what the meaning of that 1990 agreement was, either. There is a cryptic comment in the Ninth Circuit opinion which has been quoted to you, and I'm sure will be again, of -- in all of the briefing. It's under a heading called indispensable party and it indicates that Koniag may apparently be dis -- have to be dismissed because

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There's nothing which prevents an indisof the agreement. pensable party from being -- from settling with a -- with a -- another party during the pendency of the litigation.

The meaning of the 1990 agreement has never been judicially determined by this Court or by any court. in giving you a supplemental memorandum and an affidavit, I'm seeking to show factually what I believe that that 1990 agreement called for, and what it called for, I believe, is that Mr. Stratman was never to reopen this litigation or affect Koniag's interest which he knew about in 1990; the interest being in the subsurface estate of all lands which Koniag -- or which Leisnoi has wormen a construction of the constr

The determination of this Court -- the only determination this Court has made about the standing of Koniag in this litigation was that it was a necessary party. determination -- even if you read the Ninth Circuit opinion was referring somehow or another, though it never says so, to the 1990 settlement agreement between Koniag and -- and Mr. Stratman as requiring -- excuse me -- holds that Koniag may not be an indispensable party. There's a clear difference between a necessary party and indispensable party.

One of the things which Mr. Stratman at this point is trying to tell the Court in this motion -- which, by the way, has -- it cites us to no rule or no -- nor do I have any -- is it apparent under what rule it is that Koniag's dismis-

sal is sought -- is this a 12(b) motion to dismiss? Is it a 56(f) motion to dismiss?

The -- what -- what Mr. Stratman is apparently indicating in this motion is that even though he has settled with Koniag, even though he has settled and said that he would not bring this litigation and he's not going to con -- he's not going to live up to his part of the bargain, Koniag nonetheless is precluded from both defending this litigation and defending its interests -- it's subsurface interest in all of the lands which is sought to be -- which the complaint at least seek -- seeks to have returned to the United States or to Mr. Stratman or someone.

Not only does -- not only does he say that Koniag shouldn't defend those particular interests, but also he says that Koniag really shouldn't defend the interest that it has in the bargain that it reached with Mr. Stratman. Clearly, our bargain, as far as we are concerned, is that he was never going to bring this. Clearly, this is a place where -- this is the proper place to -- to bring that, and this is the proper court to request enforcement of that agreement.

But mostly what I'm here to say is that this is not the proper place to determine what the meanings and the parameters of that agreement really are. When I said that this is presented to you in -- in the form of a let's-clean-up-the-caption motion, what I -- what I'm indicating to you is

that there are substantial issues, factual issues and other issues, which need to be resolved, and this is not the proper place to do so.

The Ninth Circuit opinion does not require the dismissal of Koniag, it doesn't say so, it doesn't talk about the 1990 agreement, it does not indicate that Koniag's position in this litigation as a necessary party, it mentions nothing about that. And for those reasons, I oppose having Koniag stricken from the -- being a -- a participant in this -- in this litigation. We've been a participant in this litigation, obviously, since 1976 when it was first formed and filed before the Court, and will continue to be so. We will amend the complaint to allege that Mr. Stratman has violated the terms of the agreement, this is a -- and that the litigation should not go forward. And -- and we have presented extrinsic evidence in the form of Mr. Gross' affidavit to indicate that that's exactly what we felt that that -- that decision -- or excuse me -- that agreement stated.

I had also placed in the memorandum a suggestion that a Rule 16 conference might be of use to determine the order of things and the way this litigation should proceed. There's been a great flurry of memoranda back and forth and motions to discover and so on and so forth since the Ninth Circuit ruled. And certainly, the salutary effects of Rule 16 are to try to straighten the litigation up so that we know

issues.

What the -- the mandate from the 1982 Ninth Circuit requests that the Court, for instance, make a (indiscernible) determination as to whether or not Mr. Stratman should have exhausted his remedies. I don't want to -- I -- I don't want to characterize exactly what the Ninth Circuit said. I think it says those terms -- clearly, there -- that's an issue that the Court should look at.

an amound proceed; they're clearly threshold

Clearly, also another issue for the Court to determine was in 1982 there was a -- a request pending by the United States to have the matter sent back to the -- I suppose Interior Board of Land Appeals or ANCAB, whatever -- whichever of those two organizations. Clearly, that's something which the Court should consider.

In any event, we strongly oppose the Court considering it without Koniag being present. Unless the Court has other questions.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Landon?

DEFENDANT UNITED STATES' ARGUMENT

MR. LANDON: Morning, Your Honor. I just have four brief points.

The first, of course, is that no relief is sought against the United States, so we're really rather peripherally involved in this injunction motion. However, I did want

to clarify because in much of the argument this morning, it seemed as if Mr. Stratman was presuming to speak in the name of the United States; that we do not join in the motion.

We have said previously in our filings in this case that eve -- that it is our belief that even if Leisnoi were decertified, that they would still have existence as a state law corporation and that the United States would be barred by 1166 of Tile 43 of the U.S. Code from regaining the land, and we also believe that our -- any false claims or fraud act claims that we have -- would have had against Leisnoi are now ba -- now barred by the statute of limitations.

seems to be an assumption that if Leisnoi was improperly certified, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief he -- he seeks. We don't think that were they decertified, that would be the result. In addition --

THE COURT: Wait -- wait a minute.

MR. LANDON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Does -- does the Government oppose the motion for preliminary injunction? I assume you do from what you say.

MR. LANDON: I don't -- I don't know whether we can oppose a motion against which no relief has been asked against us, but we do not believe its well taken.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

be a discussion today that Mr. Stratman was representing the possible interest of the state or another Native corporation which he posits might get the land were the land to go out of Leisnoi's ownership. And of course, in a preliminary injunction motion, the harm to be considered is the harm to the plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot use the putative harms the third parties to — if — if the state is concerned about timbering on these lands, it should be the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alaska here asking you to shut down the operations.

plaintiff's reply brief, there was a -- a discussion which suggested that the village eligibility provision on the act of God and act of government was illegal -- invalid under the statute. There is, of course, a presumption of the validity of regulations. It is my understanding that quite a number of villages were certified under that provision, and -- and I urge the Court to exercise some caution in approaching that -- that issue.

Finally, I -- I would like to strongly support the suggestion of Koniag that the Court hold a -- a status conference rather soon. It seems hardly a day goes by that I don't get a -- a new motion delivered to me, and I think had it not been for your stay order, there would be a lot more

motions already before the Court. It

there are some threshold issues.

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If there is to be a determination of eligibility and these threshold issues do not preclude Mr. Stratman's claim, it's the Government's view that the proper thing for the Court to do would be to remand the case to the IBLA for initial determination of the eligibility of -- of Leisnoi because that was -- there never was an administrative appeal on that issue. There was the initial decision, but there was never -- that was never looked at by the agency in one of the administrative appeal tribunals in the Interior Department.

useful if prior to the conference each of the parties were asked to submit maybe a five-page paper to suggest what sort of motions they foresee coming up and their suggestions on which would be the most rational way to approach those. I — I do think that this is one of the most procedurally complex cases that I've ever dealt with and I think that the — all parties and the Court would benefit from an early status conference. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Schneider, you have the right of rebuttal.

PLAINTIFF STRATMAN'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

MR. SCHNEIDER: I think you have about eighteen minutes, Judge, and I'm going to try not to use them.

same folks that gave away the farm here to a non-existent village with no investigation, and now they want to cover that up. They don't want the light of day to shine on the Secretary's malfeasance here. Instead, they want to say, hey, we just -- you know, statute of limitations and all that happy stuff, Mr. Stratman can't get where he's going. There

is nothing in 43 U.S.C. 1166 that should bar this claim -nothing. That's for folks that show up late. We sued these

people about this problem before they got conveyance of the land.

We don't care if Leisnoi keeps its state law certificate; that's fine with us. We just want to get all their land and all their money. And, yes, it's true, we want to shut them down, we want to take them off the map. That's the object of our endeavor. That's the only endeavor we're allowed under the state of the pleadings right now; that's it.

While it is suggested that it's harm to the plaintiff that -- that Your Honor ought to consider in granting or denying our request, that only flies where the plaintiff has a direct economic interest. We wish we did -- we don't. We just don't.

Your Honor's seen -- seen me get a contingency fee of zero before, you know it's a possibility.

THE COURT: Oh, I remember a few months ago --

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MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah. I'd like to forget. 2 We've got a right to do what we're doing -can't. 3 Wait a minute. The Government's dis-THE COURT: 4 avowing you, in effect. Mr. Landon --5 MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, of course, they're disallow-6 ing us, Your Honor. 7 No, I didn't say allowing, avowing. THE COURT: 8 MR. SCHNEIDER: Disavowing our efforts? I agree. 9 They are disavowing our efforts. Let's -- let's look at the 10 only analogy I can -- I can really give to the Court that's 11 out there, that's definite, that's got a few cases on it 12 because this is - this is an extremely unusual case. If we 13 look at the False Claims Act setting, bounty hunter statute, 14 In that setting, the government has a right to come in okay? 15 and disavow. Usually, they do. 16 The keytam (ph) relater stands up, says I have a 17 claim, the government has so much time to say yes or no, they 18 usually say no, you know, bounty hunter goes on his separate 19 way, brings back scalp, gets a slice of the pie; that's the 20 way it works. Here, the government is disallow -- disavowing 21 our position; we don't think he can get there, we're not 22 really a party to the motion, we'd kind of like not to see 23 this happen. That doesn't solve the problem because the 24 irreparable harm is there, the probability of success on the 25 merits is there, these technical defenses --- and, boy, tech-

that this village thing under ANCSA is smoke and they just can't get there, so they've got to talk about technical defenses, and Your Honor knows that the law on that is very clear — you don't resolve those at this hearing. You don't. If you want to fight about those later, we fight about them later, but we don't resolve those things at this hearing.

At this hearing, you have a couple of horses with four legs, you have some irreparable harm to the only interest that will be served if the lawsuit is successful, and that's not Omar Stratman's, and if -- and if it's there, we should get that injunction. Where is the record? I mean, we -- after -- you know, sure, we filed our pleadings quite awhile ago. These folks have known this injunction motion was coming from December, and what have they done about it? You've got nothing in the record saying they're going to be hurt. You've got some smoke, you've got no fire; there's nothing in the record. The extent of the harm, none of that stuff.

And if there is and this balancing act -- we've got this in our brief and I'm not going to belabor it -- but where the public interest is really the only interest at stake, then they've got to show an awful lot of harm. How can they do it when they get to keep the trees and cut them down later? On the law and the facts, we ought to get this

injunction, the bond should be nominal because Mr. Stratman has no direct economic interest. He'd love to have one, doesn't have one; can't get there from here.

The government interest, Your Honor, here is to find by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Nothing in this case will change the fixed pie of benefits provided in that act; will not change, can't change it -- can't change it. What it can do though -- what this case can do is make the government, who seemed to be fairly generous back here when Mr. Fitzpatrick was wandering around in the wind and the rain and didn't want to look at the island too hard, and it -- make them give those benefits to Native groups that are entitled to those benefits. How is that not in the public interest?

And it's not in the public interest -- it's not in the public interest to put the lid on Mr. Stratman just because the government's a little embarrassed about the way they've handled this thing to date. Your Honor, spe -- Your Honor --

THE COURT: You really hang your hat basically on the public interest question now, don't you?

MR. SCHNEIDER: On the bond issue, I think we have to; on anything else, I don't think we have to. But on the bond issue, we have to be viewed as public interest litigants. The Court has to say what are our -- what could we do

chance to amend the complaint, but if we did, what could we claim? Could Mr. Stratman, if we wanted to -- if we made this -- if we made this motion a day before Christmas, what could Mr. Stratman get here? And the answer is zip. Your Honor said he has no economic claims, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed, he's been thrown out at the State Supreme Court level, he can't get there from here. If he was a keytam (ph) plaintiff where he could have an economic interest, then by definition -- by statutory definition, he is proceeding on behalf of the government and he would be entitled to this relief without bond.

(ph) plaintiff and is entitled to the relief without bond as a matter of statutory construction, or you look at what this man could get under any conceivable theory and when you cut — when the answer is zero, he's a public interest litigant.

ANCSA itself defines, to use their words, alleged berry pickers, like Mr. Stratman, is having the standing, the ability, to challenge bogus Native village corporations, and that's what he's doing; that's all he's doing. He was part of a citizens' group, the rest of the citizens jumped ship, he's the only guy left.

THE COURT: This may be over-naive, but why -- why don't you have an adequate remedy at law?

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MR. SCHNEIDER: I can -- I can explain that, Judge. A number of reasons. We settled with these guys, with Koniag, okay? Can't sue Koniag. However, if Koniag keeps fooling with this thing, stays in this case, submits many more affidavits, that could change. But right now, we settled with these people and so we can't sue Koniag yet. Probably can't sue Koniag unless they give us a couple more good affidavits to play with.

Now we can't sue Leisnoi because we did sue Leisnoi. That -- all those claims have to be joined, they all when through the process, we got kicked out at the State Supreme Court level. I mean, we don't have any adequate remedy at law because we've reached the end of the trial with Leisnoi on our individual claims. The individual claims we tried to assert here Your Honor dismissed, the Ninth Circuit said right on, so we're out of bullets there, too.

THE COURT: Why isn't it better -- being the devil's advocate --

MR. SCHNEIDER: Please.

THE COURT: -- why isn't it better to just go ahead with the case as directed by the recent Ninth Circuit decision and decide that -- those issues on the merits rather than get involved here with the kind of an injunction you seek?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, I'll tell you why that's not

four-hundred-year-old trees, once they're cut down, and glue them back on the stumps. And you can't take the money from these two-hundred- to four-hundred-year-old trees once they've squandered it, and have it there as a potential source of recovery for the party, probably the U.S., but I don't care who it is, ultimately entitled.

You know, we've talked about what's in our complaint and what isn't in our complaint. Lots of stuff could be in our complaint once we get around to amending it. We could -- we could ask for a constructive trust, we could ask for all kinds of relief. Even if -- even if under this statute that the government's so proud of, 43 U.S.C. 1166, even if we can't get the land back, we can get a judgment against these people, and we could get a judgment for somebody else.

And in the meantime, Your Honor, if Your Honor doesn't grant this injunction, you know what we're going to get at the end of this trail when we win? Zip. Because logs are going to be sold, the trees are going to be gone, and they're going to say, well, gosh, I guess we got the money, we got the logs, and we got our state certificate of incorporation.

Well, they can keep the state certificate, but right now they shouldn't be allowed to cut down those trees, they shouldn't be allowed to spend the money, and Your Honor

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ought to lock up every dend that is smantling from those
                Why? Because the harm is irreparable by defini-
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   operations.
   tion, because we've got a lot more than a horse race on the
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   merits, and because in the Ninth Circuit, when that happens,
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    we ought to win.
              THE COURT: Where does the money go if I lock it
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    up?
                             I don't care where it goes.
              MR. SCHNEIDER:
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    long as it stays put --
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                                            That's not an answer.
                          Well, now wait.
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              THE COURT:
              MR. SCHNEIDER: No, it isn't an answer.
                                                         Let me --
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               THE COURT: Whose -- whose the --
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               MR. SCHNEIDER:
                               Yes.
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               THE COURT: -- whose the court -- to what party is
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    the Court going to direct the funds that have been impounded,
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     shall we say --
                               Sure, sure.
               MR. SCHNEIDER:
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                           -- go when we have -- assuming you're
               THE COURT:
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               Where --
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     correct?
                               Yes, let's assume --
               MR. SCHNEIDER:
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               THE COURT: Not -- not to Mr. Stratman, you know --
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                                Negative. Ab -- absolutely --
                MR. SCHNEIDER:
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                THE COURT: Not to the government.
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                MR. SCHNEIDER: Wait, eh, eh, eh, eh, eh -- not to
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     Mr. Stratman, and that's why we're public interest litigants.
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to the government because it I the government from unerte these benefits came, okay? What does the government have to 3 do with that money then? First off, I'd suggest that's not 4 really our problem, but let me -- let me answer the question directly. The government tells us -- and by the way, I'm not 7 inclined to believe these folks, okay? And we haven't 8 briefed this issue and we haven't thought about it, but if 9 you believe what they say, what they say is we would owe it 10 to some other entitled Native group. And my answer then 11 directly to Your Honor's question is it's got to go to the

THE COURT: That sounds like litigation into the twenty-fourth century to me.

government first, they've got to give it to who they owe it

to, okay? Somebody else can fight about that. But they've

got to give it to people that are entitled to it, not people

MR. SCHNEIDER: It may be, Your Honor, it may be, but my son has expressed an interest in law school, he's in the courtroom today, and anything is possible.

THE COURT: Okay.

that are unentitled to it.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Mr. Stratman assures me he has many young and healthy heirs.

MR. BOYKO: My son, Your Honor, graduates from law school on May the 21st.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Mr. Boyko's ahead of me in that

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Judge, ANCSA is a fixed pie. You know, everybody said that, it's true by definition. They gave the pie away to people that aren't entitled to it; the pie ought to go to people entitled to it. No, they don't want to get their hands on this pie because they know how it's going to look when we start opening that box of worms and seeing what was done and not done here. It's going to be really hard to explain why on an -- on an island where everybody knew there wasn't a village, somebody got the equivalent of a hundred and fifteen thousand two hundred acres of the best land in But if we can get that back to the government, we don't much care what they do with it after that. They ought to give it to the people that are entitled, if you believe them.

If you don't believe them, then I suspect they may just be able to keep it whether they like it or not. But I'll tell you what, they may not like it. These poor folks living in Kodiak that like to take the kids out the road to go fishing in Rosalyn Creek would sure get a kick out of it. They'd like to be able to go and enjoy the Chiniak Peninsula with trees, not stumps; those people would think it's a great outcome.

So whether the government gets this stuff back and

to people entitled to it, in either instance, I -- I -- in due respect, I'd suggest the Court's not just in a position to terminate this case because it might be long, difficult, unpleasant, and painful to Leisnoi. You know, we're not the ones that submitted --

THE COURT: I'm not suggesting that, counsel, but I'm suggesting that -- it seems -- it seems to me that -- that we're going to end up in the bog somewhere on what the final result of all this has to be.

MR. SCHNEIDER: You're ab -- Your Honor, that possibility under the law addressing permanent -- forgive me -preliminary injunctions is something we sort out as the process goes along, and you've got to save the trees in the
meantime, save the choices in the meantime on this record
with no evidence of harm, no reason to grant opening to brief
the matter further, they've had months. They can sure get a
lot of affidavits. Why can't they get one from somebody
saying there's going to be a loss here? Maybe because there
isn't one, maybe because they've got deals that protect them,
I don't know, but I know that the record isn't here.

And I know that if we take all this stuff -- you know, they've got fifty-some-thousand acres. We take it away from them, somebody's going to want it, somebody's going to be entitled to it. Won't be us, but it will be -- it will be

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Does your -- do your -- does Your Honor have other questions that you'd like me to address? Because if you do, I will attempt to, and if you don't, I'll just sit down.

THE COURT: Well, just briefly. Mr. Fitzgerald dwelled to some --

MR. SCHNEIDER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- extent on this question of whether or not the -- what's involved are public lands or not.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, and I think that's a good question, and here's the answer to it.

They're not public lands in this sense: When you go down to the title -- you know, Leisnoi's a private outfit, Leisnoi owns title. Are they public lands? Heck no. That's what this lawsuit's about. When we get down to winning this lawsuit, they'll certainly be public lands.

We -- the -- the public interest -- see, in each

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one of these situations that we have cited in our brief, there's a statute that allows a private person to stand up and say, hey, wait, okay? Same sort of thing exists in ANCSA. In ANCSA, private people, upon consideration of a village corporation, can have a right to go and say, hey, wait a minute, this isn't right, this shouldn't — this outfit shouldn't be a village. That's what we're doing here. It is a perfectly analogous situation.

The second second

I can't give the Court a situation on point because as Your Honor's figuring out, I'm sure this is going to be a unique case, thank goodness. It's a unique case, but, you know, that's right, these are private lands, but that's the problem, they shouldn't be private lands, they ought to be in the hands of the public, and then on to the private party entitled. And wouldn't that private party like to get them with the trees? You know, let's say they're supposed to go to some other Native --

THE COURT: Maybe they'd rather have the money.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Exactly why -- exactly --

THE COURT: Maybe they would.

MR. SCHNEIDER: -- exactly why Your Honor ought to lock up the funds here. So even though we -- you know, if you don't stop the logging. So at least the en -- the Native entity ultimately -- ultimately entitled to these assets gets something. I mean, they either get the logs or they get the

1 money instead of saying, hey, you don't get either one. 2 Sorry, we've cut down the logs; sorry, we've spent all the 3 money; but we've got some nice grassland out here on the 4 Chiniak Peninsula we'd like to give you like we should have 5 given you back in 1980. Have a nice day. 6 If -- if the Court -- and by the way, Your Honor, I 7 -- I think -- and I think we got some stuff -- we've got a 8 lot of stuff in our brief, but I think we've got some stuff 9 in our brief on this. If you just lock up the money, don't 10 stop the logging, don't think we have to post -- I think that 11 bond problem goes way down for us. So at a minimum, the Court ought to lock up the dough, but I don't think that's 12 13 going to be a great solace to the parties ultimately entitled 14 to this land who don't get that choice. Why should that 15 choice not be their's? 16 THE COURT: Well, of course, you're correct if you 17 win, ultimately. 18 MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, that's right. And I --19 THE COURT: Who knows? 20 MR. SCHNEIDER: Well --21 THE COURT: You know, I've been around here a lit-22 tle while and I've seen the -- the silliest case win and the 23 best case lose. 24 MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, yeah, and I --25 THE COURT: I mean to juries, of course.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I nope Your Honor didn't take offense at my ready agreement to that suggestion based on some
of the things in our past.

But -- but that's why the Ninth Circuit test -that's why the Ninth Circuit test, when you have irreparable
harm, just requires a horse race. And like I said, two live
horses, four legs a horse, that's all we need. We're much
closer than that. In all of this smoke, Judge, did anybody
-- you know, one more time -- did anybody point to the village, talk about twenty-five people? They're dead meat on
that stuff. That's why they're -- they're off -- we're chasing fairies and dragens and all these technical defenses. I
mean, if -- if anything, their opposition shows we've got a
darn good chance of success on the merits.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. BOYKO: If it please the Court, you asked one question that I would like to give a one-sentence reply to, and that is if they win, the land and the trees still belong to a state corporation known as Leisnoi, Incorporated. So eventually, it still winds up with Leisnoi and so their but — their whole argument falls flat on its face.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHMITT: Your Honor? I'm here on behalf of Toni Burton, and we had filed that motion opposing having her removed as a party, and I -- just one comment from Mr.

Schneider to -- Toni doesn't need to be here because the Court could direct could direct that planing -- or pleadings be sent. Well, if they weren't sent, Ms. Burton would lose her ability to ask the Court for relief if she's removed as a party. And I think that the brief adequately addresses the other points. We would ask that the Court keep her in or perhaps just direct Mr. Stratman to execute the lis pendens

and the other parties to be prohibited from using that in any

MR. SCHNEIDER: That's fine with us.

MR. SCHMITT: A real simple way to do it, but -- I mean, she would very much like to go home and get on with her life. She's settled with Leisnoi and settled with Koniag, claims against the United States are non-existent and claims against Mr. Stratman are non-existent, but we're -- we're very much a small fish in this big complicated pool here, and if the Court could use its power here to get the parties to get her out, we'd very much appreciate it.

THE COURT: Let her out?

fashion in this litigation.

MR. SCHMITT: Well, let her --

THE COURT: I'm not -- I didn't hear what you said. Let her out?

MR. SCHMITT: In as sense, yeah, let her out of this courtroom and -- and -- and out of this having to monitor the pleadings.

THE COURT: Do you want her dismissed as a party?

MR. SCHMITT: Well, we don't want do unless we can have that -- the lis pendens executed with the agreement from the defendants that they aren't going to use it against Mr. Stratman. That's their concern as I mentioned in my opposition. Without that, Ms. Strat -- Ms. Burton has to remain in here to make sure that her rights are not impaired in some fashion.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, may I address that limited point?

THE COURT: Wo ahead.

MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you. It's fascinating that Stratman is willing to let Burton keep land that was conveyed from Leisnoi. Here he purports to speak on behalf of the government, but for his former co-hort in this frivolous litigation, he says, well, it's okay for that party to keep land that was originally conveyed to Leisnoi and then conveyed to Burton. So I just make that — that one point, Your Honor. If — the lis pendens is there. If for some reason we were to lose the land, why would Burton be entitled to keep it? And the fact that Stratman says it's okay for my co-hort to keep the land, I just don't want Leisnoi to keep it, indicates he's not acting in the public interest. Thank you.

(ALA)

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